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Boumediene v. Bush and Extraterritorial
Habeas Corpus in Wartime
by RIDDHI DASGUPTA*
How did the United States Supreme Court, in Boumediene v. Bush,'
come to the conclusion that the detention facility in Guantdnamo Bay,
Cuba, is indeed American territory for the purpose of habeas corpus? Why
did the Court extend habeas to non-citizens as well? Which legal
provisions and precedents guided the Supreme Court's analysis? The U.S.
Constitution's Suspension Clause, precluding the suspension of habeas
corpus except in well-defined and discrete national security urgencies, is
the controlling trump card raised by the detainees. This Commentary sets
the stage for a multivariable conversation about the interplay among
separation of powers, rejection of executive supremacy, historic status of
habeas corpus, and other factors that guided the Court.
The federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, extends to Guantdnamo
because of practical considerations, not necessarily formal ones; and the
consequences of excluding habeas corpus from Guantdnamo would have
been devastating for judicial independence. The Commentary also
references English and American legal history transcending pre- and post-
1789 to explore the competing merits on habeas's reach to Guantdnamo.
Furthermore, in the end, the cause of judicial restraint would be harmed by
the mechanism of governmentally approved trials (with lives and freedom
at stake) that treat citizens and non-citizens differently concerning the right
of habeas corpus.
Finally, this Commentary also advances the overarching theme that
Boumediene is essentially a civil liberties case and should be perceived as
such for prudential reasons. Boumediene retains three central tenets: the
* Doctoral student, University of Cambridge. The author is a research assistant to Professor
Neal Katyal, counsel to the petitioners in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) and in
Engquist v. Oregon Department ofAgriculture, 128 S. Ct. 2146 (2008). The author expresses his
gratitude to Professor Katyal. Any views expressed here, however, are the author's own.
1. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008).
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Suspension Clause prevents arbitrary suspensions of habeas; the right to
have an impartial court evaluate the legality of the detention is preserved
by the Suspension Clause; and habeas corpus applies both to U.S. citizens
and to non-citizens. This last theme, equal protection of the laws
guaranteed to litigants in federal claims through the Fifth Amendment's
due process guarantee, is interspersed through the text of the Commentary
and is the silent jugular of the Boumediene decision.
Introduction
On June 12, 2008, the Supreme Court of the United States decided the
case of Boumediene v Bush,2 holding that all prisoners, including foreigners
labeled as "enemy combatants" and detained at the United States Naval
Base in Guant~inamo Bay, Cuba,3 are entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.
Boumediene also held that the Military Commissions Act of 2006
("MCA"),4a federal law passed to negate this entitlement, is an
unconstitutional suspension of the prisoner's right to the Great Writ. The
MCA is a sequel to the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 ("DTA"),5 first
enacted to strip the Supreme Court and all federal courts of future subject-
matter jurisdiction in detainee cases from Guantdnamo Bay. Initially, the
detainees were held by the president (leader of the Executive Branch in the
United States government) in Guantdnamo without any judicial process in
United States courts.6 Boumediene is not the first case in the judicial
dialogue about Guantdnamo, but it is the Supreme Court's latest word.
The constitutional provision at issue in Boumediene, the Suspension
Clause of the United States Constitution (located at Article 1, Section 9,
Clause 2, and stating in relevant part that the "privilege" of habeas corpus7
2. See id.
3. Operated by Joint Task Force Guantfnamo (JTF-GTMO), this U.S. detention center is
located in Guantdnamo Bay Naval Base, which is on the shore of Guantinamo Bay, Cuba. Since
the commencement of the present U.S. hostilities in Afghanistan, 775 detainees have been
brought to Guantdnamo and 420 of those detainees have since been released. As of May 2008,
270 detainees remain.
4. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948-50 (2006), 18 U.S.C. §
2441 (2006), 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)-(e) (2006)).
5. Pub. L. No. 109-48, 119 Stat. 2680 (codified at 10 U.S.C.S. § 801 (LexisNexus 2009),
28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006), 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000dd (LexisNexus 2009)).
6. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Commentary, Hamdan v Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy
Goes to Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65 (2006); Terry Gill & Elies van Sliedregt, Guant6namo
Bay: A Reflection on the Legal Status and Rights of 'Unlawful Enemy Combatants,' I UTRECHT
L. REV. 28 (2005).
7. Access to federal habeas corpus available under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is one form ofjudicial
review codified by Congress. More common variants of collateral review familiar to federal
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may not be suspended "unless when in cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public safety may require it"), pertains to a limitation on government power
that may be waived only in specifically enumerated occasions of national
emergency.8 In Boumediene, the baseline was the year 1789 (the year of
the Constitution's ratification).9  Executive or congressional efforts to
truncate the essence of habeas corpus below what the writ was thought to
privilege in 1789 would contravene the Constitution. ° If the federal statute
is incompatible with the Constitution's Suspension Clause, then it is the
province of the Supreme Court and lower federal courts to nullify the
former.' I Nevertheless, the courts may elect to give the president and
Congress some deference in wartime.' 2 This Commentary sets the stage for
a multivariable conversation about the interplay among separation of
powers, rejection of executive supremacy, historic status of habeas corpus,
and respect for civil liberties against the positions of the president and
Congress. Given that the federal habeas statute, § 2241, extends to
Guantinamo (as Rasul v. Bush13 prescribes) and that the military tribunals
violate the traditional requirements of the common law of war (Hamdan),
Boumediene was expected. Given the Supreme Court's Rasul-Hamdi-
Hamdan track record, it was unsurprising that the judiciary would reject yet
another political attempt to exclude it from an imperative national
conversation for this generation of American lawyers.
Specifically, this challenge by Lakhdar Boumediene, a forty-two-year-
old citizen of Bosnia detained in Guantdinamo Bay,' 4 and others similarly
courts are post-conviction relief motions filed by federal prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and
habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
8. See, e.g., ROBERT WALKER, HABEAS CORPUS WRIT OF LIBERTY: ENGLISH AND
AMERICAN ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT (BookSurge Publishing 2006); 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 341,438 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1987).
9. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2244 (2008).
10. Id.; Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 286 (1983).
11. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103-04 (1958); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137,
178 (1803). With respect to federal jurisdiction, the federal court of original jurisdiction most
pertinent to this note is the District Court for the District of Columbia. Directly above this district
court is the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the federal appellate court
where most national security and military law federal actions are heard. The D.C. Circuit's
decisions can be reversed by that court itself or by the Supreme Court.
12. See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
13. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481 (2004) ("Aliens held at... [Guantanamo], no less
than American citizens, are entitled to invoke the federal courts' authority under § 2241.").
14. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2241; United States Department of Defense, List of
Individuals Detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from January 2002
through May 15, 2006, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2006/d20060515%2OList.pdf.
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situated' 5 raised the questions of whether these detainees were entitled to
habeas corpus and whether the MCA-approved collateral review
procedures accorded by the Combatant Status Review Tribunals
("CSRTs") constituted an inadequate and ineffective substitute for habeas
corpus. 16 To both questions, the Supreme Court, divided by a close 5-4
vote margin, answered in the affirmative. '
7
Boumediene is directly linked to the current war against terrorism that
the U.S. government and military are presently engaged in. 18 Indeed, the
detainees who were parties to the Boumediene lawsuit were rounded up in
January 2002, during armed conflict and eventually sent to Guantdnamo.' 9
Furthermore, support for the government's position emanates in large part
from the Authorization for the Use of Military Force ("AUMF"), 20 a joint
resolution approved by Congress. Boumediene primarily is a civil liberties
case because the historic reach of habeas corpus itself was at stake with the
resolution of the case. Munaf v. Geren,2 a case decided by the Supreme
Court the same day as Boumediene, supports this inference.
Section I of this Commentary provides a brief background to
Boumediene. Section II explores in greater depth the Supreme Court's
reconciliation of their view in Boumediene with the precedent set out in
Johnson v. Eisentrager.22  In particular, it scrutinizes the historical
contention that at common law the reach of English courts extended to
foreign subjects located in dominions within the Crown's practical control
(whatever the formal status of sovereignty and examines the deficiencies of
the CSRT structure used to try the detainees. The Commentary then
concludes.
I. The Background to Boumediene
Immediately following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S.




18. Id. at 2240-41, 2251; Daniel Williams, Who Got Game? Boumediene v. Bush and the
Judicial Gamesmanship of Enemy-Combatant Detention, 41 NEw ENG. L. REv. (forthcoming).
19. This group is both know as the "Algerian Six" and composed of six Algeria-born
Muslim men who are either naturalized Bosnian citizens or permanent residents. In 2004,
Bansayah Belkacem, Lahmar Saber, Mustafa Ait Idir, Hadz Boudella, Lakhdar Boumediene, and
Mohamed Nechle were categorized as "enemy combatants," on the basis of classified evidence,
by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal ("CSRT") consisting of three military officers.
20. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, 50 U.S.C.S. § 1541 (LexisNexus 2009).
21. See Munafv. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008).
22. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
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"use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the terrorist attacks [of September 11, 2001] ... in order to prevent
any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such
nations, organizations or persons. 23  Three years later, it was for the
Supreme Court to decide to what extent the AUMF was sufficient to
protect executive detentions from all further legal review. In Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld,24 the Supreme Court's plurality opinion by Justice O'Connor
held that "due process [under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution] demands that a citizen held in the United States as an
enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual
basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker. ' '25  Justice
O'Connor further stated that "a state of war is not a blank check for the
President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens. 26  Notably
the plurality expressed no view, ratio or obiter, on what rights, if any, non-
citizens held in Guantdnamo or other facilities retain. Nor was the Hamdi
opinion precise about what constituted a "meaningful opportunity" of
judicial access or what characteristics a "neutral decisionmaker" must have.
On the same day as the Court's decision in Hamdi was published, the
Court also announced its decision in Rasul, holding that United States
"federal courts have jurisdiction to determine the legality of the
Executive's potentially indefinite detention of individuals who claim to be
wholly innocent of wrongdoing., 27 This decision was premised on the
prevailing federal statute on habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 224 1,28 which
authorizes district courts, "within their respective jurisdictions," to
entertain habeas corpus applications by persons claiming to be held 'in
custody in violation of the . . . laws ... of the United States. 29
Rather than permitting district courts to entertain habeas corpus
actions brought by citizens under Hamdi and foreign nationals under Rasul,
23. 50 U.S.C.S. § 1541 (LexisNexus 2009).
24. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
25. Id at 533 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 536. To this extent, Hamdi truncated the already-depreciated precedential worth
of Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), the World War I-Era decision
constitutionalizing the internment of an ethnic group, based on the unsubstantiated threat of
espionage or other treasonous activities. Ironically, Korematsu helped strengthen "strict scrutiny"
as the proper judicial standard in cases where individuals are singled out for disfavored treatment
based on their race or ethnicity. See id at 216 ("[A]I1 legal restrictions which curtail the civil
rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.").
27. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004).
28. See supra note 8.
29. 28 U.S.C § 2241(a), (c)(3) (2006).
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the Department of Defense instead established Combatant Status Review
Tribunals. The function of the CSRTs, created at the direction of President
George W. Bush, was to determine whether individuals detained at
Guantinamo were "enemy combatants" who had taken up arms against the
United States. 30  The president also created military commissions, as
opposed to a regime for courts martial, to try the accused enemy
combatants without the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a speedy trial.31
Since Article II of the Constitution vests in the Executive Branch authority
in foreign affairs and war-related matters, the president unsuccessfully
asserted the unitary executive theory and his own categorical supremacy
over Congress and the Judiciary, his two coordinate and coequal branches,
in this area of the law.32
The Boumediene petitioners were aliens captured abroad (in
Afghanistan, Bosnia, or elsewhere), detained in Guantdnamo, and
identified as enemy combatants by CSRTs. Seeking habeas corpus relief
from the district court, each petitioner denied being a member of both the al
Qaeda terrorist network that executed the September 11 attacks and the
Taliban regime that received its help.33 The district court dismissed their
cases (then part of the Rasul litigation) and their prayers for habeas corpus
relief for want of jurisdiction on the rationale that Guantdnamo falls outside
U.S. sovereign territory.3 4 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district
30. Bush v. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2241 (2008).
31. Brief for the Boumediene Petitioners at 31, Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (No. 06-1195)
(Aug. 24, 2007).
32. This philosophy was summed up by Justice Thomas in his dissent in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld
Congress, to be sure, has a substantial and essential role in both foreign affairs and
national security. But "Congress cannot anticipate and legislate with regard to every
possible action the President may find it necessary to take or every possible situation in
which he might act," and "[s]uch failure of Congress ... does not, 'especially ... in the
areas of foreign policy and national security,' imply 'congressional disapproval' of
action taken by the Executive."
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 679 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678 (1981)); see Christopher Yoo, Steven Calabresi, & Anthony
Colangelo, The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2005);
Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The Not-So-Unitary
Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963 (2001); Steven Calabresi & Kevin Rhodes, The Structural
Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1555 (1992). But see Peter
Irons, "The Constitution is Just a Scrap of Paper": Empire versus Democracy, 73 U. CIN. L.
REv. 1081, 1091 (2005); Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of
Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1270 (1996); Steven G. Calabresi, Thayer's
Clear Mistake, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 269, 275 (1993).
33. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2241.
34. Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 72-73 (D.D.C. 2002).
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court's findings. 35 The Supreme Court in Rasul reversed the D.C. Circuit
and held that federal law extended habeas corpus jurisdiction to
Guantdnamo, but the Rasul Court had no occasion to decide whether the
Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution permitted the suspension of
habeas corpus petitions.36
Subsequently, the Boumediene petitioners' cases were consolidated
into two proceedings.37 In the first, the district judge granted the
government's motion to dismiss the detainees' claims, holding that the
detainees had no legal or constitutional privileges that could be vindicated
by a habeas corpus action.38 In the second, the coordinating judge held that
the detainees retained due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. 39 In
fact, as the Supreme Court noted in Rasul, when a detainee claims to have
engaged neither in combat nor in acts of terrorism against the United
States . . . [and yet has] been held in Executive detention for [a
substantial period of time] in territory subject to the long-term,
exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States, without
access to counsel and without being charged with any wrongdoing
... [the detainee has] unquestionably [been held in] 'custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States,'
[as] 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) [forbids].4°
Therefore, the Boumediene petitioners were entitled to the determination
that statutory habeas corpus extends to Guantdnamo.
In 2006, while the cases were pending, this saga was complicated by
congressional action. Four years after Guantdnamo opened, Congress
finally broke its legislative silence and passed the DTA, 4' which, according
35. Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
36. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483 (2004).
37. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2241. The statutory jurisdiction recognized in Rasul rendered
the petitioners victorious on the narrow point of 28 U.S.C § 2241 's command that habeas corpus
runs to Guantdnamo. However, the constitutional question central to Boumediene was not
reached in Rasul, and these new proceedings in the district court were commenced to determine if
the writ should in fact issue.
38. Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 314 (D.D.C. 2005).
39. In re GuantAnamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 481 (D.D.C. 2005) ("[A]II
[Guantanamo] detainees possess Fifth Amendment due process rights."). In relevant part, the
Fifth Amendment states "nor shall [any person] . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Since the Supreme Court in Boumediene
invalidated the operative MCA provision, § 7, on Suspension Clause grounds, it proved
unnecessary to resort to a due process analysis.
40. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 473 (2004).
41. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680 (codified at 10
U.S.C. § 801 (2000), 28 U.S.C. § 224 1(e) (2006), 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000dd (LexisNexus 2009)).
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to the government, effectively stripped the Supreme Court of subject-
matter jurisdiction to entertain suits from Guantdnamo. Section 1005(e) of
the DTA amended the habeas corpus statute (28 U.S.C. § 2241) to provide
that "no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to . . . consider ... an
application for ... habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained
... at Guantdnamo." 42  Furthermore, section 1005(e) accorded the D.C.
Circuit "exclusive" jurisdiction to review "enemy combatant" designations
made by the CSRTs.43 Upon deciding that the detainees were entitled to
habeas corpus, the question in Boumediene focused on whether the new
procedure, which limited judicial review to the D.C. Circuit's capacity to
review "enemy combatant" determinations, was constitutionally sufficient
under the Suspension Clause. 44
In the meantime, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld45 was climbing up the judicial
ladder. Petitioner Salim Ahmed Hamdan's contention before the Supreme
Court in Hamdan was plain: the president's military commissions were
incompatible with federal statutes 10 U.S.C. §§ 836 and 82146 and Article
21 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ").47 This is because in
comparison the commissions provided fewer jury members; provided
distinctive rules of evidence (including allowing hearsay in certain
situations), and; provided greater flexibility regarding the defendant's
presence at trial. 48  Hamdan also claimed that the international law
obligations of the United States, specifically Common Article 3 of the
42. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006).
43. Id.
44. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2244 (2008) (setting forth the issues proper for
review with respect to the Suspension Clause), 2269 (commencing a constitutional review of the
CSRT process).
45. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
46. 10 U.S.C. § 836(a) provides, in part, the following:
Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including modes of proof, for cases arising
under this chapter triable in courts-martial, military commissions and other military
tribunals, and procedures for courts of inquiry, may be prescribed by the President by
regulations which shall, so far as he considers practicable, apply the principles of law
and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the
United States district courts.
10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (2000). In other words, § 836(a) allows the president to actuate the UCMJ's
framework in the context of military courts, but these procedures must conform to procedural
rules commonplace in the district courts; must be consistent with the UCMJ itself, and; must, to
the maximum "practicable" extent, mirror the procedures used in courts-martial. Furthermore,
the complainant in Hamdan had not been charged with an "offense... that by the law of war may
be tried by military commission." 10 U.S.C. § 821(2000).
47. 10 U.S.C. § 801 (2000).
48. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at571.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 36:3
Geneva Conventions, 49 dictated the same result. 50 Moreover, he argued that
neither the "common law of war," which includes Common Article 3, nor
the UCMJ permits trial by military commissions for the crime of
conspiracy, the gravest transgression with which petitioner Salim Ahmad
Hamdan, a former chauffer to al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, was
charged.5'
Hamdan's legal arguments had deep roots. The Geneva Conventions,
adopted in 1949, concern the treatment of non-combatants and prisoners of
war. 52 Their precursors were the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907."3
The UCMJ predates the founding of the American Republic and the
Declaration of Independence. In 1775, the Continental Congress passed
sixty-nine Articles of War to govern military conduct; in 1806, Congress
first enacted 101 Articles of War into federal law; and, in 1951, the
modem-day UCMJ became effective. 54 The Rasul-Hamdi line of precedent
had traced the U.S. judicial decisions instrumental in developing this
jurisprudence, and Hamdan hoped to convince the Court that this
jurisprudence mandated that the military commissions alone were
insufficient to protect a prisoner's rights.55
The Supreme Court in Hamdan asserted its jurisdiction to decide
Guantdnamo Bay cases. First, the Court adhered to Rasul in that
Guanttnamo is United States territory for all practical purposes and that
habeas corpus applies. Second, drawing a "negative inference" from
Congress' failure to include the Hamdan-postured cases within the portion
of the DTA that stripped federal courts of Guantdnamo jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court found no want of jurisdiction.56 The Court found that the
DTA did not strip from federal judicial dockets the cases pending at the
time the DTA was enacted. Third, the UCMJ did not entitle the president
to formulate trial procedures that "violate the most basic tenets of military
and international law, including the principle that a defendant must be
permitted to see and hear the evidence against him. ' 57 Five Justices agreed
with Hamdan's claims and reversed the D.C. Circuit's denial of relief on
49. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention].
50. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 567.
51. Id.
52. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 52.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. DAVIDSON, A GUIDE TO MILITARY CRIMINAL LAW: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR ALL THE SERVICES (Naval Institute Press 1999).
55. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 567.
56. Id. at 578, 581, 584, n.15.
57. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 559 (2004).
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the merits.5 8 Justice Kennedy's separate opinion expressly insisted on the
constitutional separation of powers between the legislature and the
executive, in light of the international law obligations of the United
States.59
However, the effect of Hamdan was stunted by the Executive
Branch's decision to approach Congress for a new law. In Hamdan's
wake, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act ("MCA"). Section
7(a) of the MCA amended § 224 1(e)(1) to deny federal courts jurisdiction
in actions designed to secure habeas corpus rights for detained aliens
adjudged by the CSRT to be enemy combatants. 60  The newly enacted
§ 2241(e)(2), likewise, denies jurisdiction as to "any other action against
the United States . . . relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer,
treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement" of a detainee found to be an
enemy combatant.6
Section 7(b) of the MCA states that this jurisdictional bar to § 2241 (e)
"shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, and shall apply
to all cases, without exception, pending on or after [that] date ... which
relate to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions
of detention of an alien detained . . . since September 11, 2001 .,,62 The
MCA was unambiguous about denying "federal courts jurisdiction to hear
habeas actions, like the [Boumediene] cases, that were pending at the time
of its enactment., 63 Since under section 7(b), habeas corpus is a type of
action "relating to any aspect of ... detention," if it were held that section 7
of the MCA is not an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus, the Guantdnamo detainees would stand bereft of a judicial forum in
the United States. The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari set the stage for
a disposition on the merits.64
Deciding the Boumediene cases on appeal from the district judges, the
D.C. Circuit deduced from section 7 a strict rejection of all federal judicial
intervention to consider the habeas corpus applications.65 Accordingly, the
D.C. Circuit held that the detainees could not seek refuge under habeas
corpus or entreat the protections of the Suspension Clause.66 Since the
58. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 567.
59. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 638 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1) (2006).
61. Id. § 2241(e)(2) (2006).
62. Id.
63. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2242 (2008).
64. See Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007) (mer).
65. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F. 3d 981, 987 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
66. Id. at 990-91.
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D.C. Circuit found an impregnable bar on jurisdiction, that tribunal did not
contemplate whether the DTA provided an adequate and effective
substitute for habeas corpus. 67 The majority held that section 7 of the MCA
conformed to the Suspension Clause because habeas corpus in 1789 did not
apply to "aliens outside the sovereign's territory.68 The Supreme Court
reversed the D.C. Circuit's conclusion, and found section 7 to work an
unconstitutional denial of the detainees' right to access habeas corpus.
69
The crux of the jurisdiction question raised profound issues about judicial
authority and the Supreme Court's time-honored prerogative to "say what
the law is."'70 The Supreme Court's authority to preclude presidential or
congressional actions that violate the Constitution is an ingredient of this
prerogative. Article III, Section 1 vests such permanence in the Supreme
Court, which Congress cannot withdraw by statute. 71  For, as Justice
Scalia's Boumediene dissenting opinion commented, "The very foundation
of the power of the federal courts to declare Acts of Congress
unconstitutional lies in the power and duty of those courts to decide cases
and controversies properly before them.,
72
On the same day as Boumediene, the Supreme Court also issued its
opinion in Munaf v Geren.3 Munaf held that although § 2241 reaches
United States citizens held overseas by United States military forces,
United States courts may not enjoin the United States from transferring
alleged criminals accused of committing criminal acts within a sovereign's
territory; and, even though United States courts do retain habeas corpus
jurisdiction in such circumstances, it cannot be invoked to defeat the right
of a foreign sovereign, such as Iraq, to prosecute alleged criminals for
crimes committed on its soil.74  The importance of the Munaf case is
highlighted in Section 2, and it goes to the core of Boumediene's identity in
America's constitutional tradition.
The opinion of the Boumediene Court, authored by Justice Kennedy,
was joined by Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice
Breyer. Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Justice
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008).
70. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
71. As another hallmark of judicial independence, Article Ill, Section 1 confers that "[t]he
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior"
and that judges are entitled to compensation that "shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
72. United States v. Raines 362 U.S. 17, 20-21 (1960).
73. Munafv. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008).
74. Munaf 128 S. Ct. at 2213.
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Alito dissented from the Court's disposition of Boumediene. The Chief
Justice filed a dissenting opinion arguing that the DTA's limited review
procedure, pertaining to the review of a CSRT designation that a detainee
was an enemy combatant but not concerning whether the detention itself
was lawful, was adequate.75 Justice Scalia's dissent suggested that habeas
corpus, preserved by the Suspension Clause, "does not, and never has, run
in favor of aliens abroad; the Suspension Clause thus has no application.,
76
Moreover, Justice Scalia found the Supreme Court ill equipped to handle
national security and military matters.77 Justice Souter, joined by Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer, authored a concurring opinion disputing Chief
Justice Roberts's characterization that the Court was acting out of "judicial
haste' 78 in invalidating MCA section 7.79 In Boumediene's aftermath, the
District Court for the District of Columbia is processing the cases of the
approximately two hundred remaining detainees, entitling them to habeas
corpus review.
II. The Implications of Habeas Corpus for
Guantinamo Detainees
A. Impediments on Detainees' Access to Habeas Corpus
Section 7 of the MCA precludes detainees from supplicating U.S.
federal courts for habeas corpus. Section 7(a) amends 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(e)(1) to deny federal courts habeas corpus jurisdiction over
detainees deemed enemy combatants, while § 2241(e)(2) denies
jurisdiction for "any other action against the United States . . . relating to
any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of
confinement" of a detained alien determined to be an enemy combatant.
MCA section 7(b) provides that the 2241(e) amendments "shall take effect
on the date of the enactment of this Act, and shall apply to all cases,
without exception, pending on or after [that] date ... which relate to any
aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of detention
of an alien detained ... since September 11, 2001." Not only does section
7(a) bar judicial review to ascertain the legality of detention, section 7(b)
also forbids courts from entertaining cases of physical abuse of detainees
and denials of religious freedom.
75. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2280 (2008) (Roberts, C.I., dissenting).
76. Id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 2299.
78. Id. at 2278 (Souter, J., concurring).
79. Id.
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The question before the Supreme Court in Boumediene was whether
the federal appellate court D.C. Circuit's review of the accuracy of a
detainee's "enemy combatant" designation is an adequate and effective
substitute for habeas.80 The original (pre-DTA and pre-MCA) version of
§ 2241 authorized "any justice" or "circuit judge" to issue the writ, thus
enabling fact finding to take place in a court of original jurisdiction if the
circumstances so require .8  The DTA, however, forecloses that option by
consolidating all authority in the D.C. Circuit.82 Moreover, the Circuit's
authority is constrained to deciding whether the particular CSRT complied
with the "standards and procedures specified by the Secretary of Defense"83
and the DTA contained no exception carved out for special cases. 4 In the
D.C. Circuit, which denied Lakhdar Boumediene's application for habeas,
the dissenting judge commented that the DTA procedure to review the
CSRT's findings is not designed to cure these inadequacies. The D.C.
Circuit may review only the record developed by the CSRT to assess
whether the CSRT has complied with its own standards. Because a
detainee still has no means to present evidence rebutting the government's
case-even assuming the detainee could learn of its contents-assessing
whether the government has more evidence in its favor than the detainee is
hardly the proper antidote.8 5
In this case, however, because the D.C. Circuit had dismissed the
lawsuits on the basis that the MCA was constitutional, it did not address
whether the DTA substitute was sufficient.8 6 The Supreme Court noted the
inevitable delay that a remand would cause and reached the merits on its
own instead.87 The cardinal rule of judicial restraint-the rule of
prematurity88 -was balanced with the reality that the individuals detained
at Guantdnamo had been denied substantive judicial access for years and
80. Id. at 2240 (majority opinion).
81. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006).
82. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2276 (stating that the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(2)(B)(i), 119 Stat. 2742 (2005), enables petitioners to request "review"
of their CSRT determination in the court of appeals).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Rogers, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 990-91.
87. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262-63 (2008).
88. "The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it."' Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting Liverpool, N.Y. and Phila. Steamship Co. v. Comm'rs of
Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885)). Furthermore, the Court ordinarily abstains from needlessly
"formulat[ing] a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it
is to be applied." Id. at 347.
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that the problem raised important questions regarding the separation of
powers.89
Deficiencies contained in the CSRT structure, identified by the
Hamdan Court two years ago, include the limitations placed upon the
detainee's ability to rebut the facts on the basis of which the CSRT had
designated him an enemy combatant.90 The detainee and his civilian
counsel faced obstacles that deterred him from obtaining or presenting
evidence to challenge the government's case, precluding him from
knowing the most damaging allegations the government relied on. 9' The
detainee's military counsel retained access to this information; but, at the
presiding officer's discretion that the evidence was "probative," ("protected
information"), he could not reveal the contents to the client.92 Indeed, "the
rules only allowed [the detainees] to meet briefly with a 'Personal
Representative,' who was not a lawyer, did not represent the detainee's
interests, and could not have confidential communications with him."
93
In addition, the admissibility of hearsay (or evidence procured by
torture or other coercive techniques) meant that the detainee was unable to
meaningfully confront and cross-examine witnesses.94 Neither witnesses'
written statements nor live testimony need be sworn under oath.95 Such an
interrogative environment may induce the risk of factual error in
confessions, testimony, or other evidence exacted from the accused.96 In
July 2008, military commission judge Navy Captain Keith Allred,
presiding in the first Guantdnamo trial, was compelled to exclude certain
pieces of evidence because of "the highly coercive environments and
conditions under which [the statements] were made., 97 Salim Hamdan, the
defendant, 98 was "kept in isolation 24 hours a day with his hands and feet
restrained, and armed soldiers prompted him to talk by kneeing him in the
back. He says his captors at Panshir repeatedly tied him up, put a bag over
his head and knocked him [to] the ground." 99 An overarching problem lay
89. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 600 (2006).
90. Id. at 606.
91. Id. at 607.
92. Id. at 608.
93. Brief for the Boumediene Petitioners, supra note 31, at 11.
94. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 608.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. USAToday.com, Gitmo Trial Begins for Bin Laden's Driver, http://www.usatoday.com/
news/world/2008-07-29-GitmoN.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2009).
98. This was the same individual who had served as petitioner in Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557,
discussed earlier.
99. USAToday.com, supra note 97.
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in the remarkable concentration of power in the structure of the military
commissions.'00
[T]he Appointing Authority . . . who convenes and refers charges
against individuals to the military commissions [also decides issues
regarding the] establishment and proceedings of the commissions: to
select members who vote on guilt or innocence, to oversee the chief
prosecutor, to approve or disapprove plea agreements, to close
commission proceedings, and to answer interlocutory questions from
the presiding officer.
10
These procedural guarantees embedded in American constitutional law and
followed in civilian trials are not merely theoretical; rather, they form the
backbone of a trial as free from unnecessary factual risks. 0 2  If the
repercussion of such error is the individual's detention in Guantinamo for
the length of time in which the hostilities continue, that may obviate the
core of habeas.' °3 In order for habeas corpus or its adequate substitute to
serve as an effectual remedy, the court collaterally inquiring into the
lawfulness of the detention must be empowered to rectify errors, must
independently evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence proffered by the
government, and must consider pertinent exculpatory evidence.' °4 These
omissions in the design of the habeas substitute rendered the remedy
provided by MCA section 7 constitutionally inadequate.1
0 5
Chief Justice Roberts addressed the remedy aspect of the minority
position, Justice Scalia having spoken on the history attending English
common law. The question was narrower than constitutional issues of
habeas corpus, Chief Justice Roberts suggested, because the "practical
effects" of the DTA review process (challenging the "enemy combatant"
designation in the D.C. Circuit) sufficiently safeguards any constitutional
rights possessed by the detainees. If Hamdi's requirement of a "basic
process"' 10 6 and adjudication before a "neutral decisionmaker"'' 7 is
100. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2246, 2253 (2008).
101. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: Establishing a Constitutional Process, Hearing before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 4 (2006) (statement of Neal Katyal, Professor, Georgetown
University Law Center).
102. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2276-77.
103. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1509
n.329 (1987) ("[T]he non-suspension clause is the original Constitution's most explicit reference
to remedies.").
104. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2266-67.
105. Id.
106. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534 (2004) (emphasis added).
107. Id. at 533.
Spring 2009]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
satisfied, then the Guantdinamo military tribunals are valid. 0 8 Chief Justice
Roberts chided the majority for striking down a scheme that would have
satisfied even American citizens' due process rights; the "political branches
crafted CSRT and D. C. Circuit review to operate together" and that choice
should have been left intact. 09 Moreover, the Chief Justice contended that
the Supreme Court "merely replace[d] a [limited DTA-MCA procedural]
review system designed by the people's representatives with a set of
shapeless procedures to be defined by federal courts at some future
date.," 10
Like Justice Scalia, Chief Justice Roberts was concerned with the
federal courts intervening in a military law question without the requisite
expertise."' The majority, however, persuasively put the question within
the competence of U.S. federal courts, by balancing the ambiguity offered
by Founding Era history and practical "adaptable" considerations attending
habeas at common law." 2 Even though the Exceptions Clause in Article
III, Section 2, allows the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction to be
compromised under "such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the
Congress shall make," the Supreme Court's supremacy (preserved in
Article III, Section 1, Clause 1) to decide ultimate legal questions cannot be
eroded. 13  Moreover, at the Virginia ratifying convention Edmund
Randolph considered the Suspension Clause an "exception" to the "power
given to Congress to regulate courts."' 14 Moreover, Alexander Hamilton
stated in The Federalist No. 84 an obvious preference for limited
government, unsurprising for a generation aiming for libertarian
constitutionalism.'1 5 As noted by the New York Ratifying Convention, this
Hamiltonian excerpt does not exclude non-citizens from habeas rights:
108. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2269-70 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2279.
111. Id
112. Id. at 2267 (majority opinion).
113. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction
Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 1002, 1008 (2007) ("Article III permit[s] Congress to move cases back and forth between
the Supreme Court's original and appellate jurisdiction but not to remove cases from that
jurisdiction altogether."); Laurence Claus, The One Court that Congress Cannot Take Away:
Singularity, Supremacy, and Article 111, 96 GEO. L.J. 59 (2007); James E. Pfander, Article I
Tribunals, Article 111 Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV.
643, 648-49 (2004).
114. See 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 460-64 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1891).
115. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2247.
[Vol. 36:3
Spring 2009] BOUMEDIENE V. BUSH AND HABEAS CORPUS 441
[T]he practice of arbitrary imprisonments, have been, in all ages, the
favorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny. The
observations of the judicious Blackstone . . . are well worthy of
recital: "To bereave a man of life .. or by violence to confiscate his
estate, without accusation or trial, would be so gross and notorious
an act of despotism as must at once convey the alarm of tyranny
throughout the whole nation; but confinement of the person, by
secretly hurrying him to jail, where his sufferings are unknown or
forgotten, is a less public, a less striking, and therefore a more
dangerous engine of arbitrary government." And as a remedy for
this fatal evil he is everywhere peculiarly emphatical [sic] in his
encomiums on the habeas corpus act, which in one place he calls
'the bulwark of the British Constitution. 116
In his separate concurring opinion in Boumediene, Justice Souter
broached the issue of speed: the D.C. Circuit had had four years since
Rasul to do so; at some point, a prompt hearing is necessary."17 The
detainees could now apply directly to federal courts for habeas corpus
relief, thus circumventing the D.C. Circuit procedure to question, as the
DTA threshold requires, their very designations as enemy combatants."
8
The detainees, moreover, were entitled to a prompt hearing on their habeas
corpus applications since they had endured years of detention without
judicial oversight." 9 To reduce excessive onus on the military, including
the "legitimate interest in protecting sources and methods of intelligence
gathering" and avoiding the "widespread dissemination of classified
information,"' 120 Boumediene allowed innovative methods to entertain the
habeas challenges without offending the central purpose of habeas. The
Supreme Court concluded with the limiting principle that the Boumediene
opinion concerned jurisdiction, not merits; "the content of the law that
governs"' 12' detentions at Guantdnamo was not at the heart of the
Boumediene opinion. 12 Any reliance in a future case would be dictum, not
ratio. After allowing the access to habeas, the Court remanded the case to
the district court to decide whether particular individuals, based on their
acts, were in fact entitled to the writ.
123
116. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 512 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *136; 4 id at *438).
117, Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2278-79 (Souter, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 2276 (majority opinion).
119. Id. at 2278-79.




HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
B. Does Common Law Habeas Corpus Extend to Non-Citizens in
Guantiinamo?
No clear answer suffices here. Historic as well as practical
considerations governed the Boumediene exercise, and the former of those
conclusions could not definitively say whether enemy aliens would be
entitled to the writ at common law. 124  The Supreme Court attempted to
evaluate whether historically, at English common law, habeas corpus was
understood to extend to territories within the Crown's actual control,
whatever the formal status of the area. When adjudicating constitutional
claims rooted in the Magna Carta or other common law institutions, the
Court noted, "[O]ne of the consistent themes of the era was that Americans
had all the rights of English subjects.' 125
The evolving office of the Great Writ in English and American history
was painstakingly traced by the Boumediene opinion. The Boumediene
Court presupposed that "this history was known to the Framers [of the
American Constitution]. It no doubt confirmed their view that the pendular
swings to, and away from, individual liberty were endemic to undivided,
uncontrolled power."12 6  Even though the Magna Carta asserted that no
person would be unlawfully imprisoned, 127 the lack of an enforcement
provision and absence of a legal process to bridge the gap between the
protections and their fruition exacerbated arbitrary detentions. 2 8 Habeas
initially was "used to protect not the rights of citizens but those of the King
and his courts. The early courts were considered agents of the Crown,
designed to assist the King in the exercise of his power."'
2 9
124. Id. at2251.
125. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. at 286; see, e.g., I J. CONTINENTAL CONG. 83 (Worthington C.
Ford ed. 1904) ("[W]e claim all the benefits secured to the subject by the English constitution.");
1 AMERICAN ARCHIVES 700 (4th series 1837) (Address to the People of Great Britain, Sept. 5,
1774) (Georgia Resolutions, Aug. 10, 1774) ("[H]is Majesty's subjects in America . . . are
entitled to the same rights, privileges, and immunities with their fellow subjects in Great
Britain.").
126. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2246.
127. Magna Carta, art. 39, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 17 (Richard L. Perry &
John C. Cooper eds., 1959) ("No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or dispossessed, or
outlawed, or banished, or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him, nor send upon him,
except by the legal judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.").
128. See, e.g., 9 WILLIAMS. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 112 (1926).
129. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2244 (citing J.H BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH
LEGAL HISTORY 38-39 (4th ed. 2002)).
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By the seventeenth century, habeas corpus had come to entail
constraints on government power. 130 In spite of these developments,
political unrest and fear of mass agitation led to judicial denial or
parliamentary suspension of habeas.13  Upon Charles I's issuance of a
warrant to arrest those who refused to lend him money, the court denied the
supplicant's habeas corpus application in Darnel's Case.'32 The House of
Commons, responding to the public chorus of disapproval, swiftly enacted
the Petition of Right, 133 condemning executive enforced "imprison[ment]
without any cause" shown, and declared that "no freeman in any such
manner as is before mencioned [shall] be imprisoned or deteined."'134 By
that time, the Stuart king's authority had again become abusive, and
Parliament was dissolved. 135 Upon reconvening, Parliament moved to
preserve habeas corpus through the Act of 1640,136 enabling persons to
have impartial courts examine the legality of their imprisonment by the
order or warrant of the Privy Council or the monarch himself.137  Soon
followed a period of internal tension, called the Interregnum. In 1679,
Parliament secured procedures for accessing the writ, through the Habeas
Corpus Act of 1679.138 This Act, which William Blackstone later
considered the "stable bulwark of our liberties,"'' 39 served as the paradigm
for the habeas laws of the original thirteen American colonies. 40 The New
York convention deliberating over the fate of the Constitution in July 1788
expressed the following sentiment:
[E]very person restrained of his liberty is entitled to an inquiry into
the lawfulness of such restraint, and to a removal thereof if unlawful;
and that such inquiry or removal ought not to be denied or delayed,
130. See, e.g., Rex A. Collings, Jr. Habeas Corpus for Convicts-Constitutional Right or
Legislative Grace, 40 CAL. L. REV. 335, 336 (1952) (The writ was "the appropriate process for
checking illegal imprisonment by public officials.").
131. WALTER P. HALL & ROBERT G. ALBION, A HISTORY OF ENGLAND AND THE BRITISH
EMPIRE 328 (3d ed. 1953).
132. Damel's Case, 3 How. St. Tr. 1 (1627) (The Five Knights' Case).
133. See Petition of Rights, 3 Car. 1, ch. 1 (1627), reprinted in 5 STATUTES OF THE REALM
23-24 (1963).
134. Id.
135. Charles A. Wright, Habeas Corpus: Its History and Future, 81 MICH. L. REV. 802
(1983).
136. See 5 STATUTES OF THE REALM 110 (G. Eyre & A. Strahan, eds., 1810-22).
137. William F. Duker, The English Origins of the Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Peculiar Path
to Fame, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 983 (1978).
138. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car. 2, ch. 2.
139. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES *138.
140. See Collings, supra note 130, at 338-39.
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except when, on account of public danger, the Congress shall
suspend.., habeas corpus.
141
The word "person," as opposed to the more limiting term "citizen," informs
the universal character of the privilege, irrespective of the detainee's
citizenship status.
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Boumediene disputed the
existence of a "constitutional right to habeas corpus [for] alien enemies
detained abroad by [U.S.] military forces.' ' 142  This approach endangers
Justice Scalia's own advocacy of judicial restraint, as defended here in
Boumediene and elsewhere. 143  "Standard checks on government abuse,
such as political accountability, fail to operate," as Professor Neal Katyal
suggests, when the only victims of certain legislation are those lacking
voting rights in the United States: "20 million [U.S. permanent residents]
and 5 billion people across the planet."' 44  Judicial deference owed to
Congress (as to the States) is conditioned on the assumption that the
Legislature will not prefer one group of persons to another and will debate
the merits of an issue with impartiality. 145 As a result, selective and
targeted infliction of punishments as serious as those dispensed by a
criminal trial upon persons without political potency (exercised through the
franchise) registers equal-protection concerns. i46
Neither Justice Scalia nor the other Boumediene dissenters addressed
this paradox underlying the possibility that judicial restraint's long-run
14 1. See Resolution of the New York Ratifying Convention (July 26, 1788), reprinted in I
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 328 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1891) (emphasis added).
142. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2293-94 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
143. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1002 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring and dissenting) ("[Bly foreclosing all democratic outlet for the deep passions this
issue arouses, by banishing the issue from the political forum that gives all participants, even the
losers, the satisfaction of a fair hearing and an honest fight, .. . the Court merely prolongs and
intensifies the anguish.").
144. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Equality in the War on Terror, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1365,
1367 (2007); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 161-62 (Harvard University Press 1980); Steven Calabresi, The Supreme Court: 1990
Term-Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan
Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REv. 80, 92-93 (1991).
145. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 622 (1996) (describing "a commitment to the
law's neutrality where the rights of persons are at stake"); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432, 452 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that constitutional constraints "include[e]
elements of legitimacy and neutrality that must always characterize the performance of the
sovereigi's duty to govern impartially").
146. See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102 n.22 (1976) (stating that non-
citizens are a "class . . . whose members suffer special disabilities."). Cf Michael C. Dorf, Equal
Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 952, 994 (2002).
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aims (which they champion) would be disserved by a ruling against the
Boumediene petitioners (as they preferred). The Fifth Amendment's
guarantee of due process is the traditional candidate for federal equal-
protection challenges. 147 Justice Scalia has previously argued that "[o]ur
salvation is . . . [e]qual [p]rotection [principle], which requires the
democratic majority to accept for themselves and their loved ones what
they impose on you and m e.,,148  Traditionally in American law, Chief
Justice Marshall, 149 Justice Jackson, 150 and the Enforcement Act of 1870'51
have all appreciated the logic of equality to ensure equity: legislation or
rules that society is compelled to inflict upon everyone will not be harshly
imposed on any one entity. It is difficult to reconcile the Constitution's
equality instruction as the "salvation" against inequities with corresponding
weak enforcement of that constitutional guarantee (especially when the
group singled out for unique treatment (in this case foreigners) lacks even
the political agency to make waves electorally). If legislative changes
cannot be made by the aggrieved group through democratic means, then the
doctrinal foundation of the judicial restraint philosophy suffers a setback.
Justice Scalia also disputed the Boumediene Court's reading of the
1679 Act: "The Act,' he said, 'did not extend the writ [beyond the Crown's
sovereign territory], even though the existence of other places to which
British prisoners could be sent was recognized by the Act."
152
Furthermore, Justice Scalia explained that the Act compelled judicial
147. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1955).
148. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300 (1990).
149. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 436 (1819) (a state tax applied equally to in-state
and out-of-state companies is non-discriminatory and thus constitutional under the Commerce
Clause).
150. Railway Express Agency v. New York states the following:
[T]here is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable
government than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose
upon a minority must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to
arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only a few
to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that
might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no better
measure to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in operation.
Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring):
151. Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(2007)) states the following:
[A]Il persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory in the United States to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject
to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind.
152. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2304 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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review "not by expanding the writ abroad, but by forbidding . . . the
shipment of prisoners to places where the writ did not run or where its
execution would be difficult."'53 The statement does not dispute that the
aim of the 1679 Act was to render the authority holding the prisoner
accountable to a court of competent jurisdiction. Yet the dissent does not
clarify what must be done when the prisoners are indeed shipped to a
"plac[e] where the writ did not run" and where no other law prevailed. 54
Justice Scalia's passionate defense of American citizens' right to a fair and
speedy trial in Hamdi 55 four years ago produces the inference that the
distinction is based only on the basis of citizenship.
To allay the concern that military courts might not be able to coexist
with civilian courts, the Boumediene majority cited the American cases of
Duncan v. Kahanamoku 56 and Ex parte Milligan.157 In the Kahanamoku
case, the Supreme Court stated that while the "military [must] act
vigorously for the maintenance of an orderly civil government and for the
defense of the [region] against actual or threatened rebellion or invasion,
[the law does not permit the] supplanting of courts by military tribunals."'5 8
Likewise, in Milligan, the Court struck down a conviction by a
military commission in a state where the civilian courts were efficaciously
functioning.' 59 These decisions, while accommodating the military legal
system into the judicial fold, express a preference for civilian courts, if
possible.
160
Historically, prerogative writs, empowered with an "extraordinary
territorial ambit," could be issued to all lands where the Crown was
sovereign.'16 This precept applies to Guantdnamo. The 1903 Lease
Agreement between the governments of the United States and Cuba
governing Guantdnamo's territorial relationship to the United States cedes
to the United States "complete jurisdiction and control" over the naval
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
156. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
157. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
158. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. at 319-24.
159. ExparteMilligan, 71 U.S. at 130-31.
160. At common law, civilian justice had to be privileged over military law "when the king's
courts [were] open for all persons to receive justice according to the laws of the land." WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *413-14; see also MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 25-27 (Charles Gray ed., 1971).
161. ROBERT J. SHARPE, THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS 188 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2d ed.
1989) (1976).
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base. 162 The United States has "treated Guantdnamo as if it were subject to
American sovereignty: [it has] acted as if [it] intend[s] to retain the Base
permanently, and ha[s] exercised the exclusive, unlimited right to use it.'
163
The practice of English judges mandating habeas corpus rights (circa
1789) points, functionally, towards "the exact extent and nature of the
jurisdiction or dominion exercised in fact by the Crown."' 64 Post-1789
judicial activity in England was understood by Boumediene as confirmatory
evidence that practical authority of the ruling power was the touchstone of
sovereignty. 165 British judges often granted the common law writ to Indian
petitioners held by either Indian sovereign princes or the East India
Company. 166 This occurred even when the Crown had not yet asserted
formal control over India.167 Indeed, according to the Treaty of Allahabad
(signed in 1765), to which the Crown and the Mughal Emperor in Delhi
were the signatories, the latter retained sovereignty (though nominal) over
India. 68 Still, it was the practical jurisdiction and control which mattered,
and British judges in India issued common law writs binding on Indian
soil. 169 Courts in the new United States adopted the same common law
canon of interpretation. 170 But the Boumediene Court found the "analogy
to . . . break [] down" because the Supreme Court of Judicature was a
tribunal set up by the Parliament to function specifically in India.
171
The government made the fair point that alleged enemy aliens had
never been granted habeas privileges by common law courts. 172  In
Boumediene, the Court acknowledged as much.173  The government
advanced the analogy of English courts' relationships with the reach of
habeas to Scotland and Hanover, not India, as better mirroring the
relationship of United States courts with Guantdnamo. Scotland and
162. Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278, 1286 (9th Cir. 2003).
163. Gherebi, 352 F.3d at 1287.
164. Ex parte Mwenya, [1960] 1 Q.B. 241, 303 (C.A.) (emphasis added); see also King v.
The Earl of Crewe ex parte Sekgome, [1910] 2 K.B. 576, 606 (C.A.).
165. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2275 (2008).
166. Brief for the Boumediene Petitioners, supra note 31, at 11-13.
167. Id. at 12 (citing the Charter Act, 1813, 53 Geo. 3, c. 155, § XCV).
168. Id.; see also H.V. BOWEN, THE BUSINESS OF EMPIRE: THE EAST INDIA COMPANY AND
IMPERIAL BRITAIN, 1756-1833 10 (Cambridge University Press 2006); PETER ANTHONY
HOWELL, THE JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL, 1833-1876: ITS ORIGINS,
STRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT 9 (Cambridge University Press 1979).
169. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2249.
170. Brief for the Boumediene Petitioners, supra note 31, at 11-12 n.7.
171. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2249.
172. Id. 2249-50.
173. Id.
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Hanover were not formally part of England but were controlled by the
English monarch, simulating American relationship to the Guantdinamo
Bay territory. The Boumediene decision also acknowledged Lord
Mansfield's admission that English courts are without power to issue
habeas corpus to the "foreign" territories of Scotland and Hanover. 174 But
the Court could not overlook that
prudential considerations would have weighed heavily when courts
sitting in England received habeas petitions from Scotland or
[Hanover]. Common-law decisions withholding the writ from
prisoners detained in these places easily could be explained as efforts
to avoid either or both of two embarrassments: conflict with the
judgments of another court of competent jurisdiction; or the practical
inability, by reason of distance, of the English courts to enforce their
judgments outside their territorial jurisdiction. 175
The Founding Era history was, at best, inconclusive, and "given the
unique status of Guantdnamo Bay and the particular dangers of terrorism in
the modem age, the common law courts simply may not have confronted
cases with close parallels to this one.' 176 The Court "decline[d], therefore,
to infer too much, one way or the other, from the lack of historical evidence
on point."' 177  In short, the Boumediene Court favored Rasul's
understanding of Guantdnamo's status as within American control for
practical purposes. Federal courts are not divested of jurisdiction here, as
"[t]he Constitution grants Congress and the President the power to acquire,
dispose of, and govern territory, not the power to decide when and where
its terms apply."' 178 And reviewing its case law annals for resolution of the
constitutional issue, the Boumediene Court evinced a clear pattern:
"[Q]uestions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical
concerns, not formalism."'
179
C. The Eisentrager Dilemma
In Boumediene, the United States argued that Johnson v. Eisentrager
disqualified the Guantdnamo Bay detainees from bringing federal judicial
actions disputing the legality of their detentions because they were
174. Id.
175. Id. at 2250.
176. Id at2251.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 2259.
179. Id. at 2258.
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foreigners outside the sovereign territory of the United States.1
80
Eisentrager involved German nationals found guilty of violating the
stipulations of Germany's surrender in the waning days of World War I;
they had continued active hostilities, despite the German High Command's
unconditional surrender to the Allies. 8' A U.S. military commission based
in China had convicted the Eisentrager appellants of violating the laws of
war by taking part in continued military activity against the United States
after German surrender but before Japanese surrender. 82 The appellants
were removed to Landsberg Prison in Germany and imprisoned under the
custody of the United States Army. 83 They filed habeas corpus petitions
and, on judicial review, the Supreme Court held that the appellants did not
have the right to review because "the [U.S.] Constitution does not confer a
right of personal security or an immunity from military trial and
punishment upon an alien enemy engaged in the hostile service of a
government at war with the United States."'
' 84
In making this determination, Eisentrager articulated six factors in its
holding that deprived the German nationals of habeas review in U.S.
courts:
[The detainee] (a) is an enemy alien; (b) has never been or resided in
the United States; (c) was captured outside of our territory and there
held in military custody as a prisoner of war; (d) was tried and
convicted by a Military Commission sitting outside the United
States; (e) for offenses against laws of war committed outside the
United States; (f) and is at all times imprisoned outside the United
States. 85
To the Supreme Court sitting to decide Boumediene almost six
decades later, Eisentrager was distinguishable for a number of reasons.
Unlike the Germans in Eisentrager, the Boumediene petitioners were not
nationals of countries at war with the United States) 86 They denied having
engaged in, or plotted acts of aggression against, the United States. 87 In
180. Id. at 2257-58 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950)).
181. Id. at 2261 (citing Yale Law School-The Avalon Project, Declaration Regarding the
Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authority with Respect to Germany (June 5,
1945), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/ger01 .asp).
182. Johnson, 339 U.S. at 766.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 785.
185. Id. at777.
186. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2259-60 (2008).
187. Id. at 2260.
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addition, they had never been afforded access to any tribunal, 8 and, for
two years or longer, they had been detained in territory over which that the
United States employs exclusive control and jurisdiction. 189 Moreover, in
contrast to the Eisentrager tribunal, the Guant~namo military commissions
had been held in Hamdan to be unlawfully constituted and, American
control over Landsberg in 1950 was "neither absolute nor indefinite," as
Guantdnamo is in 2008.190
Finally, when Eisentrager was decided in 1950, Ahrens v. Clark,'9'
was governing law. Ahrens refused habeas corpus jurisdiction under §
2241 in cases where the detainees were not being held within the territorial
jurisdiction of the pertinent district court. 192  Following Ahrens, the
Eisentrager Court decided to deny itself and lower federal courts habeas
corpus jurisdiction.' 93 On that basis, the president's Office of Legal
Counsel advised him "that the great weight of legal authority indicates that
a district court could not properly exercise habeas jurisdiction over an alien
detained at [Guantanamo Bay].' 94  In his Boumediene dissent, Justice
Scalia made the interesting case that if the government believed
Eisentrager to no longer be an impediment to habeas, then "the military
surely would not have transported prisoners there, but would have kept
them in Afghanistan, transferred them to another of our foreign military
bases, or turned them over to allies for detention. Those other facilities
might well have been worse for the detainees themselves.' ' 195 Nevertheless,
intervening years and the case of Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of
188. Id. at 2263.
189. Id. at 2278 (Souter, J., concurring).
190. Id. at2257.
191. Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948).
192. Id.
193. Even though the Eisentrager majority opinion made only oblique references to 28
U.S.C. § 2241 and presumably based the decision on constitutional considerations, it is beyond
cavil that the appellants' lack of statutory entitlement (at least under Ahrens as prevailing law)
prescribed the result in Eisentrager. See generally, Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778
(1950)). In addition, while it is true that Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004), also barred a
particular district court from considering a detention challenge from Guantdnamo, the Court's
opinion and Justice Kennedy's concurrence made clear that the District Court for the Southern
District of New York was the wrong court for the suit to be entertained only because an equally
competent (and more venue-consistent) court in South Carolina was available. This was not an
effort to resuscitate Ahrens.
194. See Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin & John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney
Gens., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel,
Dep't. of Def. on Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over Aliens Held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Dec.
28, 2001), http://www.texscience.org/reform/torture.
195. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2294 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Kentucky' 96 had altered the rules of the game by the time the Guantdtnamo
cases came around.
197
Instead of the Eisentrager test, now the three new benchmarks
consistent with post-Braden habeas law to decide the extraterritorial
capacity of the Suspension Clause are (a) the detainee's citizenship and
status as well as the sufficiency of the status determination process; (b) the
type of place where the detainee is being held, and; (c) the logistical and
practical considerations impeding the detainee's access to habeas corpus.'
98
First, these considerations militated in favor of the Boumediene detainees'
habeas claims. Even though the Boumediene detainees were non-citizens,
like those actually charged in Eisentrager, the former (unlike the latter)
deny that they are enemy combatants.199 Unlike the Eisentrager prisoners,
the Boumediene detainees had never had a military commission trial for
200violating the laws of war. In comparison, the Eisentrager prisoners had
received representation by counsel, and were permitted to introduce
evidence in their own defense and allowed to cross-examine witnesses.2°'
The Boumediene detainees' inability to rebut the evidence offered against
them and the presumption of validity accorded the government's
information could not be cured by the review given in the D.C. Circuit. 20 2
Second is the venue of confinement that is central to the reach of
habeas.20 3 While "the Allies had not planned a long-term occupation of
Germany [where the Landsberg prison was located], nor did they intend to
displace all German institutions even during the period of occupation,
204
Guantdtnamo was within the "constant jurisdiction of the United States. 2 5
196. Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. ofKy., 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
197. See generally id. If doubt remained that Eisentrager no longer was good law, then
Braden delivered the final coup de grace. Braden stated that the physical location of the detainee
"is not 'an invariable prerequisite' to the exercise of [28 U.S.C.] § 2241 jurisdiction because
habeas acts upon the person holding the prisoner, not the prisoner himself, so that the court acts
'within [its] respective jurisdiction' if the custodian can be reached by service of process." Id. at
495-96 (emphasis added). Since Braden had overruled Ahrens and thus qualified the "statutory
predicate" underlying Eisentrager, the status quo prevailing at the time of Hamdan or
Boumediene did not render habeas corpus inaccessible to the detainees.
198. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259.
199. Id.
200. Id.




205. Id. at 2261.
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Third, the logistical impediments blocking resolution of the Eisentrager
detainees' habeas claims did not plague Guantinamo.0 6
Unlike the European occupation zone (covering over 57,000 square
miles with a population of eighteen million), 0 7 created in the wake of
World War II, and the incessant threats of enemy resurgence, Guantfnamo
encompasses 45 square miles208 and detains persons in a "secure prison
facility located on an isolated and heavily fortified military base., 20 9 Most
importantly, perhaps,
[A]djudicating a habeas corpus petition would cause friction with the
host government. No Cuban court has jurisdiction over American
military personnel at Guantdinamo or the enemy combatants detained
there. While obligated to abide by the terms of the lease, the United
States is, for all practical purposes, answerable to no other sovereign
for its acts on the base.21°
D. Munaf Does Not Compromise Boumediene
The calculus is even more interesting when engaging with claimants
who are neither Americans nor citizens of allied nations. On the other
hand, recognizing Boumediene as a civil liberties question, insofar as the
Supreme Court's construction of the Suspension Clause and the federal
habeas statute are concerned, helps cast the dispute on universalistic terms.
This helps connect the inferences derived from Boumediene to the rights of
Americans and non-American residents alike.211  Had the government's
interpretation of § 2241 prevailed unqualifiedly to evade "service of
process, ''212 many citizens or permanent resident non-citizens could
theoretically have been removed to Guantdnamo or other locations beyond
the formal territory of the United States. Munaf read in light of
206. Id. at 2261-62.
207. Id. at 2261 (citing Letter from President Truman to Sec 'y of State Byrnes (Nov. 28,
1945), in 8 DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 257 (R. Dennett & R. Turner eds.,
1948)); James K. Pollock, A Territorial Pattern for the Military Occupation of Germany, 38 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 970, 975 (1944).
208. Id. (citing Official U.S. Navy Website Navy-Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, History of
Guantanamo Bay, https://www.cnic.navy.mil/Guantanamo/AboutGTMO/gtmohistgeneral/gtmohi
stgeneral).
209. Id. at 2261.
210. Id.
211. See generally MUNEER I. AHMAD, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SOC'Y FOR LAW AND
POLICY, GUANTANAMO IS HERE: THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT AND NONCITIZEN
VULNERABILITY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY FOR LAW AND POLICY (2007),
http://www.acslaw.org/node/5792; Theresa A. Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent
Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611 (2003).
212. Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1973).
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Boumediene, does not permit this. 21 3 Indeed, Munaf can be understood to
delineate Boumediene' s own holding.
It might be tempting to state that the Munaf decision, which prohibits
U.S. courts from stopping the U.S. government's detainee transfers to
friendly sovereigns, undercuts the natural reading of Boumediene.214 On a
surface level, this hypothesis is belied by the fact that the two cases were
decided on the same day; each member of the Boumediene majority joined
the Munaf majority. More substantively, none of Boumediene's three
central tenets was compromised by Munaf. the Suspension Clause prevents
arbitrary suspensions of habeas; the "affirmative right to judicial inquiry
into the causes of detention" 215 is preserved by the Suspension Clause, and;
habeas corpus applies both to U.S. citizens and to non-citizens.2 6 What is
more, Munaf recognizes that "'prudential concerns' ... such as comity and
the orderly administration of criminal justice" 217 impact the scope of habeas
jurisdiction, and when such limitations are absent, habeas may issue. The
Boumediene Court cited the Scotland-Hanover example to make this
.218point.
With respect to the first concern, Munaf expressly affirms the right of
persons held "in custody under or by color of the authority of the United
States" to challenge their detentions in U.S. courts.219 Even a detainee held
by the Multinational Force-Iraq ("MNI-F"), an international coalition
joining 26 countries, may petition U.S. courts because his detention was
supervised by a unified command led by the U.S. military.22° Second,
Munaf continues to allow habeas courts to inquire into the detention's
legality and permit the United States to transfer detainees for foreign
criminal prosecution, limited to cases where the crime itself has been
committed within that foreign power's territory. 221 Third, Munaf did not
concern non-citizens, and given Boumediene's historical referencing (not to
mention the holding itself), such a distinction drawn on the basis of
citizenship status would not withstand scrutiny.222 Equality and its
constitutional underpinnings are the silent jugular here.
213. Munafv. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2213 (2008).
214. Id. at 2228 (Souter, J., concurring).
215. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2246 (2008).
216. Id. at2240.
217. Munaf 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2220.
218. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2249-50.
219. Munaf, 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2216 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1) (2006)).
220. Id. at 2213.
221. Id.
222. See, e.g., Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259; see also Magna Carta, supra note 127.
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Conclusion
Boumediene stands as a reminder that Framers of the American
Constitution appreciated the vital need for ensconcing with some
permanence this guarantee against detention under the Executive Branch's
authority (even with legislative approval), for history had proved less
stringent means to be ineffective. Nor are vague and unspecified
emergency powers approved by the Constitution. 3  For instance, the
Suspension Clause requires specific exigencies for habeas to be
suspended.224 Similarly, the Fourth Amendment forbids unreasonable
searches and seizures and the issuance of warrants "but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. ' '2 5 This level
of specificity was ensconced in the text by the authors of the Bill of Rights,
for they "viewed freedom from unlawful restraint as a fundamental precept
of liberty, and they understood the writ of habeas corpus as a vital
instrument to secure that freedom. 226 Boumediene's legal underpinnings
are driven by the reality that because constitutional provisions are not self-
executing, without a robust and enforceable protection of habeas this
"fundamental precept of liberty" might prove hollow.
However, extending habeas corpus to foreigners detained at
Guantfinamo concerns more than just the legality of their detentions.
Detainees might be allowed to seek federal judicial review of unlawful
confinement or treatment (including physical abuse, constraints on
religious expression, needless intrusions and searches of the detainees'
persons, and other constitutional violations) or to complain against being
transferred to the custody of another nation. The Supreme Court left
undisturbed the CSRT system itself, remanding the issue to the district
court along with the task of deciding whether particular detainees are
entitled to habeas. Prior to Boumediene, nearly two hundred habeas
applications had accumulated in the district court,227 and Boumediene now
223. See, e.g., Jules Lobel, Preventive Detention: Prisoners, Suspected Terrorists, and
Permanent Emergency, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 389, 410-11 (2003); Michal R. Belknap,
Historical Observation: The New Deal and the Emergency Powers Doctrine, 62 TEX. L. REv. 67,
77(1983).
224. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2229, 2259, 2277.
225. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
226. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2244.
227. Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 5-4, Back Detainee Appeals for Guantinamo, N.Y. TIMES,
June 13, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/1 3/washington/ I 3scotus.html?pagewanted=all.
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renders the issue ripe for individualized, case-by-case resolution.228 In
order to comply with Boumediene, habeas review must satisfy several
attributes: promptness (timely consideration of claims such that indefinite
or long-term detention does not occur); comprehensiveness (the habeas
court must be empowered to correct errors in enemy designations); rebuttal
of the prosecutorial evidence; assistance of counsel; a determination of the
lawfulness of confinement; and the prospect of conditional or complete
release as a distinct possibility if no grounds for detention suffice.
Further inconsistency might encourage the Supreme Court to clarify
the parameters of a habeas-consistent trial owed the detainees. Nor did the
Supreme Court in Boumediene resolve whether detainees held in some
other extraterritorial location are entitled to the protections of habeas. The
functional test to be employed for such determinations
include the degree and likely duration of U.S. control over the
location where the alien is held; the costs of holding the Suspension
Clause applicable in a given situation, including . . . the likelihood
that the proceedings would compromise or divert attention from a
military mission; and the possibility that adjudicatin a habeas
petition would cause friction with the host government. 2Y
Finally, the proper understanding of Boumediene is as a civil liberties
case resultant from martial circumstances, rather than as a war case through
and through. But "[w]hat's in a name? That which we call a rose/By any
other name would smell as sweet., 230  Why should it matter whether
Boumediene is called a civil liberties case or a war case? Surely the
decision's text and its stare decisis value remain unaltered.
The answer has to do with the Constitution's protection of equality.
Equality is the silent jugular in this constitutional calculus. The Court
reaffirmed the core of habeas corpus, a common law writ with roots
extending back to 1215 .23 1 Habeas corpus affects citizens as well as non-
citizens in times of war and peace.232 It denotes the power of courts to
question the legality of a detention, and it entitles the detainee to seek such
228. See JENNIFER K. ELSEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ENEMY COMBATANT
DETAINEES: HABEAS CORPUS CHALLENGES IN FEDERAL COURT (updated Sept. 10, 2008),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33180.pdf.
229. See MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., BOUMEDIENE v BUSH:
GUANTANOMO DETAINEES' RIGHT TO HABEAS CORPUS 10 (updated Sept. 8, 2008),
http://ftp.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34536.pdf.
230. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2.
23 1. See sources cited supra note 8.
232. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008) (holding that Article 1, Section
2, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution "has full effect at GuantAnamo Bay").
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a judgment from an impartial tribunal. 23  Habeas traditionally has made no
distinction between citizens and non-citizens, so long as a competent
tribunal could practicably follow up with ensuring that a detention
complies with the laws to which a jurisdiction is subject. 234 In that sense,
Boumediene, though a product of September 1 1 and ensuing hostilities, has
had consequences far wider in American constitutional law, not just
military or national security law. Classifying this decision as a war case
evokes martial images somehow pertinent only to a few, thus distancing the
full impact of Boumediene from the polity's routine and collective
existence. Boumediene represents, in the words of one commentator,
[I]mmutable principles of man and the rights attending our existence.
It was.., about our willingness to live under such conditions as we
would impose on others. Ultimately, it was not about detainees by
whatever names we may give them, but about every one of us and




234. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2244.
235. Stephen Abraham, Op-Ed., Getting Back on Track After Boumediene, JURIST, June 29, 2008,
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2008/06/getting-back-on-track-after-boumediene.php.
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